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May. 29th, 2005 08:35 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
vicarzWhen I was an undergrad, I bumped into a new-at-the-time line of theory of people's hueristical errors in areas of probability in a series of studies by Kahneman and Tversky. At the time I was first fascinated by the failings, but then decided that in nature there was no real risk for which statistical analysis was an evolutionary advantage - and that the failings had no real-world applications. I was tempted to link the failings to gambling, but I thought learning theory and reinforcement patterns better suit that issue.
I've just been reading http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/yjolt/files/20042005Issue/6_Taipale121804Fx.pdf#search='Technology,%20Security%20and%20Privacy:%20The%20Fear%20of%20Frankenstein'
as part of my privacy seminar, and found a later analysis of K&T's work by Cass Sunstein, who gives me this lovely quote about how statistics are ignored...but more importantly notes the effect of fear, particularly of the uncontrollable, in policy making. Short version - terrorism threats make people go nuts. This also applies to leftist nonsense such as reactionary environmentalism.
(begin quote)"Cass Sunstein, among others, has written much about the notion that people act apparently irrationally with regard to certain risk trade-offs. For example, during the recent DC sniper episode, citizens of one state would drive to another to get gas rather than use a local gas station for fear of the sniper – thus exposing themselves to greater statistical risk of death from a traffic fatality than from an actual sniper attack. So too, people who fear flying and prefer to drive may actually expose themselves to a much greater risk of injury or death on the highway.
Sunstein identifies three noteworthy points about how fear impacts risk analysis. The first is that without actual knowledge of a particular risk, people rely on the availability heuristic, through which they assess a risk by reference to whether a readily available example of the outcome can be recalled, that is, people exhibit a greater fear of a risk the more they are reminded of actual or similar outcomes. The second is that people generally show a disproportionate fear of risks that are either unfamiliar or appear hard to control, that is, people exhibit a greater fear of a risk from an unfamiliar or novel source even if its probability is slight. And, the third is that people are prone to what Sunstein calls probability neglect – that is, in the face of risks with high emotional content, emotion plays a significant role in obscuring 'rational' choice.
These three impacts are also observed in policy choice. Sunstein has documented many instances in which media attention to a particular environmental issue, for example, Love Canal, Alar, or asbestos in schools, has resulted in 'irrational' policy choices not grounded in objective assessments of relative risk. In these instances the media focus essentially determines the emotional state of the polity. Further, the media attention itself is often manipulated by what Sunstein calls "availability entrepreneurs" who take advantage of a particular event to publicize (and thus elevate) a relatively unlikely risk in order to further their own particular agenda.
Thus, the public debate on policy issues – particularly on complex issues or novel problems with unknown consequences – is often dominated by these information entrepreneurs, including activists and the media itself, who attempt to engender information cascades to further their own particular agenda. "An [information] cascade is a self-reinforcing process of collective belief formation by which an expressed perception triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception increasing plausibility through its rising availability in public discourse." The result is often that relatively minor risks can be overblown causing a high level of social anxiety, the expenditure or misallocation of significant resources, and the imposition of costly regulation in situations where other risks, of greater magnitude, are ignored." (end quote)
I like the approach of addressing the problem broadly, rather than the facets we typically face. So the FOX right-wing machine is using the same technique as the leftist groups. I'm sure you already have your stance on the means-ends debate.
I've just been reading http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/yjolt/files/20042005Issue/6_Taipale121804Fx.pdf#search='Technology,%20Security%20and%20Privacy:%20The%20Fear%20of%20Frankenstein'
as part of my privacy seminar, and found a later analysis of K&T's work by Cass Sunstein, who gives me this lovely quote about how statistics are ignored...but more importantly notes the effect of fear, particularly of the uncontrollable, in policy making. Short version - terrorism threats make people go nuts. This also applies to leftist nonsense such as reactionary environmentalism.
(begin quote)"Cass Sunstein, among others, has written much about the notion that people act apparently irrationally with regard to certain risk trade-offs. For example, during the recent DC sniper episode, citizens of one state would drive to another to get gas rather than use a local gas station for fear of the sniper – thus exposing themselves to greater statistical risk of death from a traffic fatality than from an actual sniper attack. So too, people who fear flying and prefer to drive may actually expose themselves to a much greater risk of injury or death on the highway.
Sunstein identifies three noteworthy points about how fear impacts risk analysis. The first is that without actual knowledge of a particular risk, people rely on the availability heuristic, through which they assess a risk by reference to whether a readily available example of the outcome can be recalled, that is, people exhibit a greater fear of a risk the more they are reminded of actual or similar outcomes. The second is that people generally show a disproportionate fear of risks that are either unfamiliar or appear hard to control, that is, people exhibit a greater fear of a risk from an unfamiliar or novel source even if its probability is slight. And, the third is that people are prone to what Sunstein calls probability neglect – that is, in the face of risks with high emotional content, emotion plays a significant role in obscuring 'rational' choice.
These three impacts are also observed in policy choice. Sunstein has documented many instances in which media attention to a particular environmental issue, for example, Love Canal, Alar, or asbestos in schools, has resulted in 'irrational' policy choices not grounded in objective assessments of relative risk. In these instances the media focus essentially determines the emotional state of the polity. Further, the media attention itself is often manipulated by what Sunstein calls "availability entrepreneurs" who take advantage of a particular event to publicize (and thus elevate) a relatively unlikely risk in order to further their own particular agenda.
Thus, the public debate on policy issues – particularly on complex issues or novel problems with unknown consequences – is often dominated by these information entrepreneurs, including activists and the media itself, who attempt to engender information cascades to further their own particular agenda. "An [information] cascade is a self-reinforcing process of collective belief formation by which an expressed perception triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception increasing plausibility through its rising availability in public discourse." The result is often that relatively minor risks can be overblown causing a high level of social anxiety, the expenditure or misallocation of significant resources, and the imposition of costly regulation in situations where other risks, of greater magnitude, are ignored." (end quote)
I like the approach of addressing the problem broadly, rather than the facets we typically face. So the FOX right-wing machine is using the same technique as the leftist groups. I'm sure you already have your stance on the means-ends debate.
